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We employed the propensity score matching and estimated the causal effect of being certified 
organic crop producers on farm household income and its various components in the United 
States. Contrary to the standard assumption in economic analysis, certified organic farmers do 
not earn significantly higher household income than conventional farmers. Certified organic crop 
producers earn higher revenue but they incur higher production expenses. In particular, certified 
organic producers spend significantly more on labor expenses, insurance payments, and 
marketing charges than conventional farmers. The results suggest that early adopters of organic 
farmers have done so for non pecuniary reasons and the lack of economic incentives can be an 
important barrier to conversion to organic farming in the United States. 
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   1.  Introduction   
United States Department of Agriculture defines organic farming as “a production system 
that is managed in accordance with the Organic Foods Production Act and regulations to respond 
to site-specific conditions by integrating cultural, biological and mechanical practices that foster 
cycling of resources, promote ecological balance, and conserve biodiversity” (USDA, 2011). 
Organic farming has been one of the most thriving segments in the U.S. farm sector over the last 
decade (Kuminoff and Wossink, 2010) due to growing demand for healthy food products by 
consumers.  Although acres under organic farming explained only about 1% of the total acres in 
the United States in 2008 (Greene, et al., 2010), more than 600,000 acres operated by 9,000 
farms were undergoing the transition from conventional to organic farming in 2007 (Census of 
Agriculture, 2007). The retail sales of organic products have increased by 480% from $3.6 
billion in 1997 to $21.1 billion in 2008 (Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2009).   
Organic farming can also meet the growing social concern for conservation of environmental 
resources in rural America. Environmental benefits of organic farming includes but not limited to 
improved water quality due to reduced pesticide residues, reduced nutrient pollution, better 
carbon sequestration, enhanced biodiversity (Greene, et al., 2009), improved soil condition, and 
more healthy food (O'Riordan and Cobb, 2001). The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 
2008 increased mandatory funding for organic programs by five-fold compared to the previous 
legislation (USDA, 2009). The Act also provided financial support to farmers converting to 
organic for the first time at the national scale (Greene, et al., 2009). 
Despite the growing trend in demand for organic products, consumers of organic products 
recently witnessed periodic shortages of organic products, primarily because supply of organic 
foods failed to catch up with the rapidly increasing demand (Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2009). A 
number of factors are documented as barriers for conventional and beginning farmers to be 
certified organic in the United States. First, uncertainty surrounding the legislative environment 
has given farmers incentives to wait and see until more information about subsidy payments and 
technical assistance becomes available (Kuminoff and Wossink, 2010). Second, there are 
psychological and sociological costs of converting to organic farming from peer farmers and 
family members (Gardebroek, 2006). Once determined to convert to (or start up) organic farming, 
farmers must go through a three-year transition period during which they are required to practice 
organic farming but not allowed to sell products as organic. With the typically lower yields 
during this transition period, the conversion process poses significant financial risk to the farmers. Securing marketing channels for organically grown commodities is another challenge for organic 
farmers (Khaledi, et al., 2010, Lohr and Salomonsson, 2000). Furthermore, the profit margins for 
organic products has diminished due to the recent increase in overall food prices (Fromartz, 
2008) and the recession in the U.S. economy (Greene, et al., 2009). Finally, but not the least, 
organic farming is subject to a greater degree of yield variability than conventional farming due 
to limited opportunities to prevent crop failures through fertilizer and/or pesticide applications 
(Gardebroek, 2006).  Organic farmers face a number of input constraints as they are not allowed 
to use synthetic chemicals, antibiotics, genetically modified organisms, and hormones in crop 
and livestock production (Mayen, et al., 2010). 
Organic grains and soybeans are perhaps the most susceptible to these barriers as they are the 
two of the slowest growing sector in organic farming in the United States (Dimitri and 
Oberholtzer, 2009). While acres devoted to organic pasture land increased by 220% between 
2002 and 2007, organic crop acres increased by only 76%.  Moreover, organic soybean acres 
decreased by 28% from 174,000 acres in 2000 to 125,000 in 2008 (USDA, 2010). This is of 
great concern, as organic grains and soybeans are crucial inputs for organic dairy and meat 
products. Organic grain and soybeans production continues to be a bottleneck for the growth of 
organic farming in the United States (Greene, et al., 2009). 
Amid the debate about the unstable and often deficient supply of organic products and the 
potential barriers to convert to or start-up organic farming, there is one important question that 
has gathered much less attention so far in the literature: Are organic farmers really economically 
better off than conventional farmers? Of course, organic farmers can receive higher prices for 
their organic products and consumers exhibit higher willingness to pay for organic products 
(Stevens-Garmon, et al., 2007). Empirical evidence also suggests that organic farmers typically 
obtain positive profit margin (McBride and Greene, 2007, McBride and Greene, 2008). However, 
U.S. farmers have shown reluctance to converting to organic farming despite the growing 
demand for organic products in the United States. Furthermore, there is a dearth of academic 
studies on barriers that may exist to explain such reluctance in the United States (Dimitri and 
Oberholtzer, 2009). In particular, no empirical evidence has demonstrated that organic farmers 
are making positive economic profits after taking account for the potentially large opportunity 
cost of organic farming such as additional labor expenses and forgone off-farm income due to 
additional labor requirements for the operator on the farm. Herein lies the objective of this study. 
We empirically examine if farms producing certified organic crops are associated with higher 
farm household income than conventional farms in the United States. We do so by estimating the average treatment effect of various components of farm household income using the propensity 
score matching. Due to the nature of the data, the focus of this study is limited to certified 
organic crop producers and it does not include certified organic livestock producers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we review existing studies 
on factors influencing adoption of organic farming.  The third section introduces theoretical 
motivation of the average treatment effect and the propensity score matching with an emphasis 
on practical application. The fourth section describes data used in this study, followed by 
empirical results in the fifth section. The final section offers concluding remarks. 
2.  Adoption of Organic Farming 
In the United States, organic certification is administered by the Department of Agriculture 
under the National Organic Program established in 2002. Organic certification is mandatory for 
all farmers and food handlers with at least $5,000 annual sales in organic products. Certification 
procedure begins with selecting a certifying agency, out of 50 state and private certification 
programs currently available in the United States. Applicants must go through a three-year 
transition period during which they are required to practice organic farming but not allowed to 
sell products as organic.  
Organic farming has a longer history and a wider social recognition in Europe than in the 
United States as European governments have been more active in subsidizing organic farming to 
promote environmental benefits (Flaten, et al., 2010). Most empirical studies on factors 
associated with conversion to organic farming are conducted in Europe using a various form of 
limited dependent variable models.   
Burton et al. (1999) estimated a multivariate logit model to identify a range of sociological 
factors associated with certified organic, non-certified organic and conventional farming for a 
sample of 237 horticultural producers in the United Kingdom. They found that female operators, 
awareness toward environmental issues and membership with environmental organizations are 
positively associated with being certified organic whereas farmers’ age was negatively 
associated with organic farming.  Lohr and Salomonsson (2000) employed a probit model to 
analyze factors that determine the need for government subsidy to convert to organic farming in 
Sweden. They found that more diversified farms or farms with many sales outlets for organic 
products do not require subsidy to convert to organic farming. Flaten et al. (2010) examined the 
characteristics of farmers who had ceased organic operation in Norway using factor analysis and 
linear regressions. Regulations regarding organic farming and economics reasons were the primary reasons for discontinuing organic production among Norwegian farmers. In a study 
using panel data from Finnish farms, Pietola and Lansink (2001) used a switching-type Probit 
model to estimate factors determining the choice between organic and conventional farming. 
Factors such as input and output prices and subsidy rates influence the probability of converting 
to organic from conventional. Specialization in either livestock or crop production reduces the 
likelihood of the conversion as it allows conventional farmers to exploit economies of scale and 
increase profitability. Finally, Gardebroek (2006) and Flaten, et al. (2005) confirmed the 
generally held belief that organic farmers are more risk prone than conventional farmers in 
Netherland and Norway, respectively. 
There exists a dearth of quantitative analyses exploring reasons for and barriers to converting 
to organic farming in the United States and North America. As a few recent exceptions, Khaledi, 
et al. (2010) estimated a upper-limit Tobit model to identify factors influencing the share of 
organic acres in the total operated acres, using data from a survey of organic farmers in Canada. 
Higher satisfaction with marketer functions, less problem in marketing (both of which are 
measured on a Likert scale), and use of the Internet for marketing positively influence the 
intensity at which farmers adopt organic production. On the other hand, older farmers, farms 
with larger total cultivated acres, and longer distance from the farm to cleaning location are 
associated with lower adoption intensity of organic production. Kuminoff and Wossink (2010) 
developed a theoretical model to assess the option value to switch to organic farming and 
employed a switching regression model to shed light on reasons for the slow growth of organic 
soybean farming in the United States. Uncertainty surrounding profitability of organic farming 
and sunk cost associated with the conversion were the crucial barrier for U.S. farmers to convert 
to organic. Finally, MacInnis (2004), using a Tobit and a logit model, examined the effect of 
transaction cost on the choice of marketing channels for organic and conventional farmers in the 
United States. The results suggest that lack of marketing channels for organic products can be a 
significant barrier to entry to organic farming. 
The review of literature above sheds light on an important argument that is absent in the 
existing literature. Few studies, if any, have directly explored economic implications of 
converting to or starting up certified organic production not just for farm businesses but also for 
farm households. The latent variable approach adopted in most of the existing studies is based on 
the random utility framework. The underlying assumption in the random utility framework is that 
farm operators are rational economic agents who would convert to organic if the net present 
value of future income stream from certified organic production exceeds that of conventional farming or any other occupational choices available to them. However, non-economic factors can 
also play an important role in explaining farmers’ decision with respect to the conversion to 
certified organic production especially for those who value land stewardship and the 
environmental amenity of the farmland. Padel and Lampkin (1994) argued that non-economic 
factors could be important reasons for converting to organic, especially for early adopters. 
According to this argument, non-economic factors may have played an important role in the 
growth of organic farming industry in the United States so far and, if so, the recent slow-down in 
organic production, especially organic grain production, could be explained by the lack of 
economic incentives. The potential lack of economic incentives for organic grain production is 
even more prominent in the United States, due to the presence of genetically modified crop 
varieties that have become so popular over the last 15 years because of its convenient features 
(Smith, 2002). 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine the fundamental assumption of classical 
economic framework: Are organic farmers really better off than conventional farmers? Our 
analysis employs the propensity score matching to estimate the average treatment effect of being 
certified organic crop producers on farm household income and on various components of 
revenue and cost of production. 
3.  Average Treatment Effect and Propensity Score Matching 
The objective of this study is to estimate the treatment effect of being certified organic crop 
producers on various components of farm household income. Estimation of “treatment effect” 
under non-experimental setting has recently become increasingly popular in social science 
research. There have been a number of reviews on theoretical background (Heckman, et al., 1998, 
Imbens, 2004, Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, Morgan and Harding, 2006, Nichols, 2007, 
Wooldridge, 2001) and practical applications (Abadie, et al., 2004, Baser, 2006, Becker and 
Caliendo, 2007, Becker and Ichino, 2002, Nannicini, 2007) on this topic as well as some 
empirical applications in agricultural economics (Liu and Lynch, 2007, Mayen, et al., 2010, 
Pufahl and Weiss, 2009) 
An ideal situation to estimate the average treatment effect is when we can simply compare 
two outcomes for the same unit when it is assigned to the treatment and when it is not (Imbens 
and Wooldridge, 2009), or, in the context of this study, a farm’s household income when the 
farm is producing certified organic crops and when it is not. The quantity of interest, the average 
treatment effect on the outcome variable in the population of interest can be expressed as:  
      =       −     ,  (1) 
 
where     is the outcome variable with treatment and     is the outcome variable without treatment. 
However, a practical problem that arises given a cross sectional dataset is that we can only 
observe either     or    , because the assignment to the treatment is mutually exclusive. Thus, 
estimating the average treatment effect of being a certified organic crop farm on farm household 
income centers on estimating the counterfactual or imputing missing data (Wooldridge, 2001). 
That is, it is necessary to estimate farm household income that a certified organic crop farm 
would have earned if the farm had not been certified organic or farm household income that a 
conventional farm could have earned had it been certified organic. In this study, we are 
interested in the former effect or the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT): 
 
      =       −    |  = 1 ,  (2) 
 
where   is a binary variable that represents the treatment status.   = 1 indicates assignment to 
the treatment and   = 0 otherwise.  
The biggest challenge in estimating such a causal effect in observational studies is the fact 
that assignment to treatment is not random. Unlike in an experimental study in which 
participants can be randomly selected to control and treatment groups, individuals often “self 
select” into the treatment in most of social science research with observational data. In the 
context of this study, farmers are not randomly assigned to produce conventionally or organically. 
Instead, some farmers are more likely to voluntarily choose to obtain organic certification than 
others. When assignment to the treatment is not random, simply comparing the outcome variable 
between the two groups ignores some underlying factors that influence both assignment to the 
treatment and the outcome variable. For example, if farmers’ educational attainment is positively 
correlated with both acquisition of organic certification and farm household income, then the 
difference in farm household income that may exist between the two groups of farm households 
may be attributable to both the treatment status, i.e., organic or conventional, and educational 
attainment. Estimating the average treatment effect without controlling for this sample selection 
effects leads to a biased estimate. 
One special case in which the treatment effect in observational studies can be estimated is 
when assignment to treatment can be fully explained by observable variables, as in an experimental setting. In such a case, any bias inherent in comparing outcome variable (e.g., farm 
household income) between the control group (conventional farms) and the treatment group 
(certified organic crop farms) can be removed by matching observations in the two groups based 
on observable variables, or covariates. When observations in the treatment group can be matched 
against observations in the control group that share similar characteristics based on covariates, 
any difference in the outcome variable that may exist can be assumed to be independent of 
treatment status. That is,  
 
      ,     ⊥  |  =  ,  (3) 
 
where   is a vector of covariates. The implication of equation (3) is that any remaining 
difference in the outcome variable can be solely attributed to the treatment status (Imbens, 2004) 
and assignment to the treatment can be considered purely random among observations with 
similar observable characteristics (Becker and Ichino, 2002). This assumption is termed in 
various ways, such as “ignorability” (Wooldridge, 2001), “selection on observables” (Fitzgerald, 
et al., 1998), and “unconfoundedness” (Imbens, 2004, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  
A practical challenge remains as to how observations in two groups can be matched with 
each other. Even with a large sample, it becomes extremely unlikely to have multiple 
observations with identical values of   covariates especially when one or more of   variables are 
continuous. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed the propensity score, which is a conditional 
probability of being in the treatment: 
 
       =        = 1|  =    =     = 1|  =   ,  (4) 
 
where      in equation (4) can be obtained by a standard probit or logit model. An important 
feature of the propensity score in equation (4) is that it summarizes information contained in  -
dimentional vector into a single-index variable (Becker and Ichino, 2002). It is important to note 
that the unconfoundedness assumption in equation (3) is not a testable hypothesis (Becker and 
Ichino, 2002). What is testable instead is the balancing property: 
 
    ⊥  |       (5) 
 When equation (5) is satisfied, assignment to treatment is random for observations with the same 
propensity score (See Becker and Ichino, 2002 for more detail). With the two assumptions in 
equations (3) and (4), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proved that the unconfoundedness 
assumption in equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
 
      ,     ⊥  |    .  (6) 
 
That is, potential outcomes,     and    , are independent of treatment status, given the propensity 
score. When equation (6) holds, we have  
 
       |  = 1,   =      |  = 0,  .  (7) 
 
The left hand side of equation (7) is the counterfactual, i.e., the population average of the 
outcome variable which the treated units would have obtained if they had not been in the 
treatment, conditional on covariates. Equation (7) implies that the counterfactual on the left hand 
side can be estimated by the population average of the outcome variable for the controlled units, 
again, conditional on covariates.  
 
Observations in the control and treatment groups can be matched according to the 
propensity score. Because it is infeasible to find an exact match in terms of      for every 
treated observation, a number of matching procedure has been proposed in literature, including 
Nearest-Neighbor Matching, Radius Matching, and Kernel Matching (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
It is important to note that propensity score matching does not eliminate the selection bias due to 
unobservable factors that explain assignment to treatment, but it only reduces it (Becker and 
Ichino, 2002). Also note that there is no a priori superior matching method and different 
matching estimator could obtain different results. In this study, we present results from Nearest-
Neighbor Matching proposed by Abadie et al. (2004) and estimate the average treatment effect 
for the treated with a varying number of matches because it “provides may options for fine-
tuning the estimators” (Abadie, et al., 2004)
1. 
The estimator for the average treatment effect for the treated is given as: 
 
                                                        
1 Results from Radius Matching and Kernel Matching suggested in Becker and Ichino (2002) are available upon 
request.  
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1
  
       −        
 
 :    
,  (8) 
 
where    is the number of observations in the treatment and the subscript,  , represents 
individual observations. While     is the observed outcome variable for  th individual,  0     are 
not observed and given as follows: 
 
 
       =  
    if    = 0
1
 
     
 ∈  
if    = 1
   (9) 
 
where  is the number of matched observation and    is the set of observations in the 
control group matched to  th observation in the treatment.        if     = 1 is simply a 
weighted average of the outcome variable for all matched observations in the control group. 
The estimation of the average treatment effect using the propensity score matching is 
considered a nonparametric approach as researchers can avoid assumptions common in 
regression models. First, we do not have to specify a functional form of the dependent variable. 
In a standard regression setting, we implicitly assume that the dependent variable can be 
specified as a linear combination of a set of independent variables, including some quadratic 
terms and interaction terms. In production economics, researchers often choose a specific 
functional form (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, trans-log, etc.) that is conforming to the theoretical 
expectation in a given context. However, the average treatment effect estimator using the 
propensity score matching does not require such an assumption.  Second, it also does not require 
any distributional assumption (Wooldridge, 2001). For example, in the standard least square 
model, a very restrictive but almost blindly accepted assumption is that conditional distributions 
of the dependent variable are identical at any values of the covariates except for the means, 
which are to be estimated by the least square method
2.  For all conditional distributions of the 
dependent variable given the covariates, variances, skewness and kurtosis are assumed to be 
identical.  However, the estimators of the average treatment effect are free from any kind of 
distributional assumptions.  
                                                        
2 Of course, least squares method can be extended to Generalized Least Squares method to handle heterogeneous 
variances in conditional distributions, i.e, heteroskedasticity. 4.  Data 
This study primarily utilizes data obtained from the 2008 Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey (ARMS), developed by the Economic Research Service (ERS) and the National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS). The 2008 ARMS queried farmers on all types of 
financial, production, and household activities. The ARMS is also used to determine production 
costs and returns of agricultural commodities and measures net farm income of farm businesses. 
Another aspect of ARMS’s important contribution is the information it provides on the 
characteristics and financial conditions of farm households, including information on input and 
risk management strategies and off-farm income.  
ARMS uses a multi-phase sampling design and allows each sampled farm to represent a 
number of farms that are similar in the population, the number of which being the survey 
expansion factor (Dubman, 2000). The expansion factor, in turn, is defined as the inverse of the 
probability of the surveyed farm being selected. The survey collects data to measure the financial 
conditions and operating characteristics of farm businesses, the cost of producing agricultural 
commodities, and the well-being of farm operator households. 
Operators associated with farm businesses representing agricultural production across the 
United States are the target population in the survey. USDA defines farm as an establishment 
that sold or normally would have sold at least $1,000 of agricultural products during the year. 
Farms can be organized as sole proprietorships, partnerships, family corporations, nonfamily 
corporations, or cooperatives. For the purpose of this study, operator households organized as 
nonfamily corporations or cooperatives were excluded. We also excluded farms whose total 
value of crop sales is less than $5,000 considering the facts that farms with less than $5,000 of 
organic sales are not required to be certified organic and that the 2008 ARMS data only collects 
information about certified organic crop production.  We have 2,689 observations in this study 
after these omissions. 
In addition to the 2008 ARMS data, we utilize two more variables obtained from obtained 
from 2007 Census of Agriculture. We use the sum of average acres under and in transition to 
certified organic production at the county level. This variable is used to capture the peer effect on 
converting to certified organic production, mentioned in Gardebroek (2006). We also use the 
median household income at the county level to approximate regional demand for organically 
produced commodities.  Table 1 provides the definitions of the variables used in our analysis and the mean values for 
the entire sample, certified organic crop farms and conventional farms. Of 2,689 observations, 
only 65 of them (or 2.4% of the entire sample) produced certified organic crops in 2008. The last 
column shows t-test statistic that compares means of the treated and the control observations. For 
example, relative to conventional farmers, certified organic crop farmers, on average, tend to 
engage in farming as a primary occupation, possess a more diverse portfolio of enterprises but 
less likely to grow genetically modified crops and receive government payments.  While there 
are no statistically significant differences between the two groups in terms of uses of marketing 
and production contacts, organic farmers are more likely to use roadside stores, farmers markets, 
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), regional distributors, state branding programs, and 
direct sales to local grocery stores, restaurants or other retailers as direct marketing outlets. Note 
that the t-test statistics simply compares the means of each variable for both organic and 
conventional farmers without controlling for any underlying factors. The purpose of using the 
propensity score matching is to overcome this issue and estimate the causal effect of the 
treatment variable on the outcome variable. 
5.  Empirical Results 
Propensity Score Estimation 
 
Conditional probability of growing certified organic crops is estimated by a probit model. 
Table 2 reports parameter estimates for the model. The set of independent variables used in the 
model represents the vector of covariates,  , in equations 3 through 7. The variables are selected 
based on empirical findings in the literature. To represent the farm operator’s characteristics, we 
include operator’s years of formal education, primary occupation, and age. We expect that more 
educated and younger farmers whose primary occupation is farming have higher probability of 
being certified organic. Farm characteristics included are the entropy index of enterprise 
diversification, a dummy variable for growing genetically modified crops, total operated acres, 
debt to asset ratio, a dummy variable for seeking advice from the Natural Resource Conservation 
Service (NRCS) and a dummy variable for receiving government payments.  
Considering the importance of marketing outlets for organic products in the existing 
literature, we included dummy variables for using marketing contracts, production contracts, and 
several direct marketing strategies. Direct marketing strategies include use of roadside stores, 
farm stores, farmers markets, Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), regional distributors, state branding programs, and direct sales to local grocery stores, restaurants, and other retail 
stores. Use of any of the above marketing strategies is expected to positively influence the 
decision to convert to or start-up certified organic crop production. High-value crop farms and 
farms with an Internet connection are expected to be positively associated with having organic 
certification. To capture potentially heterogeneous impacts of geographical location of the farm, 
we included dummy variables for farms located in urban and rural counties as well as for five 
production regions defined by National Agricultural Statistical Service (USDA, 2010). Finally, 
we make use of two county-level statistics obtained from the 2007 Census of Agriculture. First, 
we include the number of acres under or in transition to certified organic production. We expect 
this variable to have a positive impact on the probability of being certified organic; a larger 
presence and a wider social acceptance of organic farmers in a county should positively 
influence the decision to be a certified organic farm. Second, we include the county-level median 
household income to represent purchasing power and demand for organically produced 
commodities. This variable is also expected to have a positive sign to the extent that organically 
produced commodities are sold and consumed locally. 
The estimated probit model satisfied the balancing property in equation (5) using the 
algorithm detailed in Becker and Ichino (2002). The likelihood ratio statistics of 122.23 suggests 
that the estimated model is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We briefly review the 
results here. More educated operators and operators whose primary occupation is farming are 
more likely to be certified organic crop farmers. As expected, farmers growing genetically 
modified crop corn, soybeans, wheat or cotton are less likely to produce other types of crops with 
organic certification. Farms that have production contract or sells their commodities through 
Community Supported Agriculture or regional distributors are positively associated with 
certified organic crop production. High-value crops farms are also more likely to be certified 
organic. Farmers in the Atlantic, South and Plains regions are less likely to be certified organic, 
relative to the West region, which includes states such as California, where organic farming has 
been very popular. The county average acres under or in transition to certified organic 
production have a positive coefficient, supporting our expectation about the peer-effect that 
farmers surrounded by more organic farmers are more likely to convert to certified organic. 
 
The Average Treatment Effect for the Treated 
 Predicted probability of producing certified organic crops are obtained from the probit 
model and used as the propensity score to facilitate matching of observations in the treated group 
against those in the control group. Nearest-Neighbor matching estimator developed by Abadie, et 
al. (2004) allows users to specify the number of matches,  , for each treated observation. The 
choice of an appropriate   requires a trade-off. For instance, when   = 1, each treated 
observation is matched with an observation in the control group with the closest propensity score, 
however, any unmatched observations in the treatment are discarded. When   is larger, on the 
other hand, more observations can be utilized, but the quality of match may have to be 
compromised. We estimate the average treatment effect using   = 1,⋯5. The results in Table 3 
shows that, for all the variables for which the ATT is estimated, the choice of   does not 
influence statistical significance, indicating robustness of the estimated ATT. 
Table 3 lists the estimated average treatment effect of certified organic crop production on 
total farm household income, total off-farm income, gross cash farm income, total production 
expenses, and various components of production expenses. The average treatment effect for the 
treated (ATT) on farm household income is positive for all   = 1,⋯5, but the estimates are not 
significant even at 10 per cent level. Contrary to the general assumption of profit maximization 
in many economic analyses, there is no statistically significant difference in terms of farm 
household income between certified organic crop farms and conventional farms in the United 
States. The absence of economic profit from certified organic crop production in terms of farm 
household income indicates that there are some important non-pecuniary reasons to drive farmers 
to convert to or establish certified organic crop production. The result here is in accordance with 
the argument put forth by Padel and Lampkin (1994) that factors such as land stewardship and 
concerns for environmental conditions of the farmland can be important motivations for early 
adopters of organic farming.  
The ATT on off-farm income is also insignificant for all   = 1,⋯5, indicating that there is 
no significant difference in off-farm income that can be attributable to treatment status. Because 
organic farming is often considered more labor intensive, it may be reasonable to surmise that 
conventional farmers earn higher off-farm income. However, no such difference is detected at a 
statistically significant level once we match certified organic crop famers with conventional 
farmers who are equally committed to farm operation.   
Certified organic crop farmers earn significantly higher gross cash farm income than 
conventional farmers, but they also incur significantly higher production costs. The ATT on 
gross cash farm income ranges from $1 to $1.4 million while the ATT on total production expenses is between $885,000 and $1 million. Even though certified organic crop farmers make 
significantly higher revenue relative to conventional farmers, a majority of revenue margin is 
explained by higher production cost, which is consistent with the fact that the ATT on farm 
household income is not significant. Given the fact that certified organic farmers incur much 
higher production costs than conventional farmers, we estimate the ATT on various components 
of production costs to delineate different cost structures that may exist between certified organic 
and conventional farmers. While the ATT on chemical and fertilizer expenses is not significant 
for all   = 1,⋯5, the ATT for labor expenses, insurance expenses and marketing charges are all 
positive and significant. The point estimates of the ATT indicate that certified organic farmers on 
average spend $310,000 to $361,000 more on labor, of which $230,000 to $300,000 are 
explained by cash wages paid to hired farm workers, not including custom works. Certified 
organic crop farmers also pay $8,000 to $12,000 more for insurance programs, relative to 
conventional farmers. This confirms the view that organic production poses more risk and 
uncertainty to farmers (Gardebroek, 2006). Even though organic farmers are more risk prone 
than conventional farmers (Flaten, et al., 2005, Gardebroek, 2006), certified organic producers 
are actively hedging risks by spending more on insurance programs. Finally, certified organic 
crop farmers, on average, pay somewhere between $110,000 and $120,000 more for marketing 
services than conventional farmers. The existing literature often pronounce the importance of 
securing sales outlets for organically produced commodities and the lack thereof as a potential 
barrier to converting to organic (Greene, et al., 2009, Khaledi, et al., 2010, Lohr and 
Salomonsson, 2000, MacInnis, 2004). Additional financial burden of more than $110,000 that 
certified organic farmers choose to bear attests to the significant marketing risks certified organic 
farmers face in the United States. 
6.  Conclusion 
Although organic farming has been one of the most thriving segments in the U.S. farm sector 
over the last decade (Kuminoff and Wossink, 2010), consumers of organic products recently 
witnessed periodic shortages of organic products. There is a dearth of academic studies on 
barriers that may exist to explain barriers to converting to or establishing certified organic 
production in the United States (Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2009). The objective of this study was 
to examine if organic farmers were really better off than conventional farmers, in an effort to 
explore reasons for the relatively low adoption rate of organic farming in the United States 
(Kuminoff and Wossink, 2010). Instead of the conventional parametric regression method, we employed a nonparametric approach and used the propensity score matching method to estimate 
the average treatment effect of being certified organic crop farms on farm household income, 
off-farm income, farm revenue, and various components of production costs. The propensity 
score matching method allowed us to estimate the marginal effect of being certified organic crop 
producers on various components of farm household income without specifying functional forms 
or making distributional assumptions about the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variables. 
Our findings suggest that organic crop farmers are not significantly better off in terms of 
farm household income. Even though the average gross cash income for certified organic crop 
farms is approximately $1 million higher than that for conventional farms, they also incur 
significantly higher production costs, which explains at least about 60% of the extra revenue they 
receive relative to conventional farms. Most of the additional cost for organic farming is 
explained by labor cost, insurance expenses and marketing charges. Organic farms on average 
pays $310,000 to $361,000 more on labor, of which $230,000 to $300,000 are explained by cash 
wages paid to hired farm workers, not including custom works. Despite the finding that organic 
farmers are more risk prone than conventional farms, our findings suggest that they are very 
active in hedging greater risk and uncertainty inherent in organic farming. Insurance expenses 
are up to $12,000 per year higher for organic farms than conventional farms. Organic farms pays 
up to $120,000 more for marketing charges than conventional farms. 
Finally, it is important to note that the additional production expenses that certified organic 
crop producers must bear do not include potentially very large fixed cost of converting to 
certified organic production. Given the fact that most of the government subsidy for certified 
organic producers is currently directed toward conversion costs, we suggest that more policy 
efforts be made to provide support for covering the additional variable cost such as insurance 
payments and marketing charges to hedge extra risk and uncertainty inherent in organic farming.  
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   Table 1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics   
  Mean   





Organic  T-score 
Certified Organic (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.02  0.00  1.00     
Operator's years of formal education  13.62  13.60  14.43  -0.00   
Primary occupation (=1 if farming, 0 otherwise)  0.88  0.87  0.95  1.94  * 
Operator's age  55.30  55.30  55.29  -0.00   
Entropy index of diversification (1 is completely 
diversified, 0 is not diversified at all) 
0.01  0.01  0.02  -2.01  ** 
Genetically Modified Crops (=1 if farm grows GM crops, 0 
otherwise) 
0.54  0.55  0.18  -5.85  *** 
Total acres in operation  1,750.26  1,765.50  1,108.26  -1.55   
Debt to asset ratio  0.34  0.34  0.17  -0.14   
NRCS (=1 if farm seeks advice from Natural Resource  0.13  0.13  0.15  0.46   
Government Payment (=1 if farm receives government 
payments, 0 otherwise) 
0.72  0.72  0.55  -2.99  *** 
Marketing contracts (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.47  0.47  0.43  -0.71   
Production contracts (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.09  0.09  0.12  0.97   
Roadside stores (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.05  0.05  0.14  3.25  *** 
Farm stores  (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.04  0.04  0.08  1.48   
Farmers markets (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.04  0.03  0.12  3.92  *** 
Community Supported Agriculture (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.00  0.00  0.03  4.20  *** 
Regional distributors (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.02  0.02  0.12  5.77  *** 
State Branding Program (=1 if used, 0 otherwise)  0.01  0.01  0.03  2.06  ** 
Direct sales to local grocery stores, restaurants or other 
retailers (=1 if used, 0 otherwise) 
0.06  0.05  0.15  3.47  *** 
Urban (=1 if the farm located in urban county, 0 otherwise)  0.47  0.47  0.40  -1.13   
Rural (=1 if the farm located in rural county, 0 otherwise)  0.09  0.09  0.03  -1.67  * 
Internet (=1 if farm has an Internet connection, 0 otherwise)  0.79  0.79  0.88  1.78  * 
High-value crops farm (=1 if farm is classified as high-
value crops farm, 0 otherwise) 
0.24  0.23  0.60  6.84  *** 
Atlantic region (=1 if farm is located in Atlantic region)  0.17  0.17  0.18  0.25   
South region (=1 if farm is located in South region)  0.15  0.15  0.03  -2.66  *** 
Midwest region (=1 if farm is located in Midwest region)  0.29  0.30  0.17  -2.24  ** 
Plains region (=1 if farm is located in Plains region)  0.18  0.19  0.05  -2.92  *** 
West region (=1 if farm is located in West region)  0.20  0.19  0.57  7.51  *** 
Total acres under organic production in county  18.76  21.46  75.31  8.85  *** 
Median Household Income in county ($ per year)  45,346  45,651  49,638  2.98  *** 
Total Household Income ($ per year)  209,565  208,407  258,340  0.62   
Total Off-farm Income ($ per year)  35,470  35,721  24,915  -0.80   
Gross Cash Income ($ per year)  1,261,368  1,228,580  2,643,018  3.92  *** 
Total Cost of Production ($ per year)  789,310  762,191  1,932,063  4.42  ***  
   
Cash wage ($ per year)  155,615  146,302  548,056  4.99  *** 
Total labor expenses ($ per year)  205,475  192,960  732,825  5.26  *** 
Contract labor expenses ($ per year)  22,536  20,900  91,447  3.25  *** 
Insurance expenses ($ per year)  30,997  30,989  31,364  0.05   
Marketing Charges ($ per year)  29,124  26,371  145,117  6.13  *** 
Number of observations  2,689  2,624  65     Table 2: Probit Model Parameter Estimates 
Variables  coefficient  standard errors  p-value 
Operator's years of formal education  0.082  0.036  0.024 
Primary occupation   0.508  0.261  0.051 
Operator's age  -0.005  0.005  0.332 
Entropy index of diversification   2.113  2.072  0.308 
Genetically Modified Crops   -0.487  0.186  0.009 
Total acres in operation  0.000  0.000  0.263 
Debt to asset ratio  0.000  0.016  0.992 
NRCS   0.099  0.171  0.560 
Government Payment  0.234  0.171  0.171 
Marketing contracts   0.105  0.134  0.433 
Production contracts  0.377  0.192  0.049 
Roadside stores  0.171  0.241  0.477 
Farm stores    -0.183  0.258  0.480 
Farmers markets   0.361  0.258  0.161 
Community Supported Agriculture   0.982  0.571  0.086 
Regional distributors   0.596  0.262  0.023 
State Branding Program   0.028  0.466  0.952 
Direct sales to local grocery stores, restaurants or  0.076  0.229  0.739 
Urban   0.188  0.150  0.211 
Rural   -0.003  0.320  0.992 
Internet   0.029  0.189  0.878 
High-value crops farm   0.302  0.168  0.073 
Atlantic region   -0.329  0.186  0.078 
South region   -0.813  0.303  0.007 
Midwest region   -0.325  0.199  0.102 
Plains region   -0.566  0.255  0.027 
Total acres under organic production in county  0.002  0.001  0.013 
Median Household Income in county ($ per year)  0.000  0.000  0.487 
Constant  -3.660  0.740  0.000 
Number of Observations = 2,689  LR test statistic =122.3 
Log-likelihood=-245.057  P-value (LR=0)<0.00 
 
   Table 3: Estimates of the Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) 
Variable  Number of matches ( )  ATT  standard error  p-value 
Total Household Income   1  126,279  129,374  0.33 
2  97,512  91,917  0.29 
3  52,109  99,952  0.60 
4  52,112  89,605  0.56 
5  29,922  86,940  0.73 
Off-farm Income  1  374  12,346  0.98 
2  1,196  12,896  0.93 
3  727  12,637  0.95 
4  -1,647  12,386  0.89 
5  -1,004  12,572  0.94 
Gross cash farm income  1  1,419,264  732,068  0.05 
2  1,322,389  654,926  0.04 
3  1,174,434  649,759  0.07 
4  1,167,293  608,967  0.06 
5  1,043,621  595,396  0.08 
Total production expenses  1  1,028,366  528,706  0.05 
2  1,055,155  515,823  0.04 
3  982,724  522,926  0.06 
4  999,293  504,467  0.05 
5  885,084  500,464  0.08 
Fertilizer and chemical 
expenses 
1  173,358  171,044  0.31 
2  191,112  162,386  0.24 
3  155,037  166,241  0.35 
4  169,641  161,788  0.29 
5  156,078  159,847  0.33 
Labor expenses  1  361,500  194,146  0.06 
2  381,912  179,552  0.03 
3  375,262  181,661  0.04 
4  356,794  172,416  0.04 
5  305,352  171,709  0.08 
Cash wages  1  292,514  149,747  0.051 
2  302,029  143,712  0.036 
3  301,123  143,944  0.036 
4  271,409  135,777  0.046 
5  230,613  138,807  0.097 
Insurance expenses  1  10,696  5,811  0.07 
2  12,099  5,750  0.04 
3  12,219  6,007  0.04 
4  12,439  5,989  0.04 
5  8,485  5,750  0.14 
Marketing Charges  1  126,983  56,984  0.03 
2  124,390  56,376  0.03 
3  120,260  56,641  0.03 
4  118,601  56,451  0.04 
5  111,907  57,399  0.05  
 
   